

A	Course Title & Number	INS 396: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Political Economy													
B	Pre/Co-requisite(s)	Permission of instructor, head of department and dean													
C	Number of credits	1-0-1													
D	Faculty Name	Barry Hashimoto													
E	Term/ Year	Spring 2017													
F	Sections	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>CRN</th> <th>Course</th> <th>Days</th> <th>Time</th> <th>Location</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td>INS</td> <td>T</td> <td>1:30-3:30</td> <td>PHY 225</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>				CRN	Course	Days	Time	Location		INS	T	1:30-3:30	PHY 225
CRN	Course	Days	Time	Location											
	INS	T	1:30-3:30	PHY 225											
G	Instructor Information	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Instructor</th> <th>Office</th> <th>Telephone</th> <th>Email</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Dr. Barry Hashimoto</td> <td>225</td> <td>56 913 3553</td> <td>bhashimoto@aus.edu</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday, 3:40 to 4:40 in Physics 225</p>				Instructor	Office	Telephone	Email	Dr. Barry Hashimoto	225	56 913 3553	bhashimoto@aus.edu		
Instructor	Office	Telephone	Email												
Dr. Barry Hashimoto	225	56 913 3553	bhashimoto@aus.edu												
H	Course Description from Catalog	<p>This directed study requires the student to read, understand and synthesize advanced literature emphasizing the interaction of politics and markets on phenomena such as trade, finance, capital flows, exchange rates, production, migration, central bank policy, corruption, development, crisis politics, and economic sanctions. The student will survey the history of international political economy in the twentieth century. S/he will then review literature on interests toward (and ideas about) globalization; the origins, functioning, and effectiveness of international organizations, international economic law, and domestic institutions having an influence on the international economy; and the nexus of politics and international markets for goods, services, capital, and debt. The purpose of this survey will be to identify an interesting topic, puzzle, and research question. The student will write a research paper with a new argument, new implications for academic knowledge and policymaking, and possibly new evidence, too.</p>													
I	Course Learning Outcomes	<p>Upon completion of the course, the student will be able to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Synthesize and comprehend advanced literature in one area of political economy: either trade, finance, capital flows, exchange rates, production, migration, central bank policy, corruption, development, crisis politics, or economic sanctions. 2. Develop an original argument in the field of political economy. The argument may be a point in an existing conversation in the literature, a theory, an evaluation of a theory on logical or empirical grounds, and/or an argument about facts. 3. Write and revise a research paper at a rigorous academic standard. 													

<p>J</p> <p>Textbook and other Instructional Material and Resources</p>	<p>Core required reading: Jeffrey Frieden. 2006. <i>Global capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century</i>. W.W. Norton, N.Y. 1st ed.</p> <p>The list below contains suggested readings for the course in sections A, B, C, D, E, and F. These are organized by topics mapping onto the student’s expressed interests.</p> <p><u>A. Individuals’ interests in international political economy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” <i>Journal of International Economics</i> 54(2): 267–292. • Hainmueller, Jens and Michael Hiscox. 2006. “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade.” <i>International Organization</i> 60(2): 469–498. • Hays, Jude S., Sean D. Ehrlich and Clint Peinhardt. 2005. “Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis.” <i>International Organization</i> 59(2): 473–494. • Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” <i>International Organization</i> 63 (3): 425-57. • Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies.” <i>Economics and Politics</i> 19(1): 1–33. • Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. 2010. “Attitudes toward Highly- Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” <i>American Political Science Review</i> 104 (1):61-84. • Goldstein, Judith L., and Margaret E. Peters. 2014. “Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession.” <i>International Interactions</i>. • Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden and Stephen Weymouth. 2008. “Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data.” <i>IMF Staff Papers</i> 55(3): 417-444. • Baker, Andy. 2005. “Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs.” <i>American Journal of Political Science</i> 49(4): 924–938. 2 • Mayda, Anna and Dani Rodrik. 2005. “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?” <i>European Economic Review</i> 49(6): 1393–1430. • Dutt, Pushan and Devashish Mitra. 2005. “Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation.” <i>Review of Economics and Statistics</i> 87(1): 59–72. • O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Richard Sinnott. 2001. “The Determinants of Individual Trade-Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence.” <i>Brookings Trade Forum</i> 2001: 157–196. • Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. <i>Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers</i>. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
---	--

- Tavares, Jose. 2008. "Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(1): 163–168.
- Verdier, Daniel. 1994 *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860–1990*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Mo. 2013. "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61: 399–442
- Mayda, Anna Maria. 2008. "Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?" *Economic Letters* 101: 160–163.
- Peters, Margaret E., and Alexander M. Tahk. 2011. "Are policy makers out of touch with their constituencies when it comes to immigration?" Typescript, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin, Madison.
- Walter, Stefanie. 2008. "A New Approach for Determining Exchange-Rate Level Preferences," *International Organization* 62:405-38.
- Jupille, Joseph and David Leblang. 2007. "Voting for Change: Calculation, Community and Euro Referendums," *International Organization* 61:763- 82.

B. International organizations in international political economy

- Bagwell, Kyle and Robert W. Staiger. 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT." *American Economic Review* 89(1): 215–248.
- Maggi, Giovanni and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures." *Journal of Political Economy* 106(3): 574–601.
- Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99(3): 389-400.
- Davis, Christina. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review*. 98:1. 153-69.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000." *International Organization* 60(4): 811–846.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2013. "Immigration, Delegation and International Law." Working Paper. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
- Singer, David Andrew. 2004. "Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization," *International Organization* 58(3): 531-565.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolutions Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?" *Journal of Legal Studies* 16: 189-212
- Kucik, Jeffrey and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62 (Summer): 477–505.
- Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International

Trade Cooperation." *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190–214.

- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56(3): 477– 513.
- Maggi, Giovanni and Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 2007. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements." *American Economic Review* 97(4): 1374- 1406.
- Staiger, Robert W. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy." In Grossman, Gene M. and Kenneth Rogoff. eds. *Handbook of International Economics*. Vol. 3. New York, NY: Elsevier, pp. 1495–1551.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter and Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829–857.
- Grossman, Gene M. and Elhanan Helpman. 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks." *Journal of Political Economy* 103(4): 675–708.
- Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold J. Henisz, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. "Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 55(6):1047-1073.

C. Evaluating the effectiveness of international institutions in international political economy

- Busch, Marc L. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61 (Fall): 735–61.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98–114.
- Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein and Douglas Rivers. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005–2018.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019–2025.
- Colgan, Jeff. 2014. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market." *International Organization*.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Tobin, Jennifer. 2009. "Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?" In *The Future of Investment Arbitration*, R.P. Alford & C. A. Rogers eds.
- Allee, Todd and Clint Peinhardt. 2011. "Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 65(3): 401–432.
- Gray, Julia. 2017. *Governance Against the Odds: States, Bureaucracies, and Vitality in International Economic Organizations*. Book manuscript. See ch. 5.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2007. "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 122(2):569-600.
- Kerner, Andrew and Jane Lawrence. 2014. "What's The Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation." *British Journal of Political Science* 44(1): 107-121.
- Staiger, Robert W. and Guido Tabellini. 1999. "Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?" *Economics and Politics* 11(2):

109–44.

- Bagwell, Kyle and Robert Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gowa, Joanne and Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94." *World Politics* 57(4): 453–478.
- Limao, Nuno 2006. "Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States." *American Economic Review* 96(3): 896–914.
- Limao, Nuno 2007. "Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-Trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?" *Review of Economic Studies* 74(3): 821–855.
- Estevadeordal, Antoni, Caroline Freund and Emanuel Ornelas. 2008. "Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization Toward Nonmembers?" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(4): 1531–1575.
- Jackson, John. 2000. "The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism." *Brookings Trade Forum 2000*: 179–219.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.

D. The role of domestic political regime type in international political economy

- Polanyi, Karl. 1944. *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press. 2001 Edition.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. *Golden Fetters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321.
- Timmer, A. S. and J. G. Williamson. 1998. Immigration policy prior to the 1930s: Labor markets, policy interactions, and globalization backlash. *Population and Development Review* 24(4): 739–771.
- Li, Quan and Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries." *International Organization* 57(1): 175–211.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. "Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.
- Steinberg, David and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. "The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type of Exchange Rate Policy." *World Politics* (2014).
- Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade in Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59(1): 107–143.
- Kono, Daniel Y. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency." *American Political Science Review* 100, 3 (August 2006): 369–384.
- Bearce, David H. and Hallerberg, Mark. 2011. "Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes" *Economics and Politics*. 23(2): 172–194.
- Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang. 2008. "Democracy and Globalization."

Economics and Globalization. 20(3): 289-334.

E. The role of domestic political institutions in international political economy

- Alt, James E. and Michael Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309–338.
- Pinto, Pablo, and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. "The Politics of Investment. Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Economics & Politics* 20(2):216–254.
- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 16(2): 334–364.
- Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." *International Organization* 56(4): 863-889.
- Money, Jeanette. 1997. No Vacancy. The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced, Market Economy Countries." *International Organization* 51:4.
- Leblang, D. and Satyanath, S. 2006. "Institutions, expectations, and currency crises." *International Organization*, 60(1): 245.
- Bernhard, William and David Leblang. 1999. "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments." *International Organization* 53(1): 71-97.
- Clark, William Roberts and Hallerberg, Mark. 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 94(2): 323-346.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53(4): 669–698.
- Irwin, Douglas A. and Randall S. Kroszner. 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley." *Journal of Law and Economics* 42(2): 643–673.
- Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry." *Comparative Political Studies* 29(6): 689–717.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41(2): 203–223.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Marc L. Busch. 1995. "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Organization* 49(4): 723–749.
- Park, Jong Hee, and Nathan Jensen. 2007. "Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2):314-329.
- Keefer, Philip and David Stasavage. 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 407–423.

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Yuyong Thaicharoen. 2003. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50(1): 49-123.

F. International finance

- North, Douglass, C. and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803–832.
- Stasavage, David. 2003. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stasavage, David. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785." *International Organization* 61(3): 489–525.
- Simmons, Beth A. and Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171–189.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 2003. "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition." *International Organization* 57(1): 3–42
- Simmons, Beth A. 2000. "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs" *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819K35.
- Von Stein, Jana. 2005. Do treaties constrain or screen? Selection bias and treaty compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99(4), 611–622.
- Nunn, Nathan. 2007. "Relationship Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 122(2):569-600.
- Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz. 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis." *Review of Economic Studies* 48(2): 289–309.
- Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 2009. "The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default." *Journal of Economic Literature* 47(3): 651–698.
- Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1996. *Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

<p>K Teaching and Learning Methodologies</p>	<p>This course is based around meetings between a student conducting independent research and the instructor of the independent study, almost identical to the relationship between a graduate thesis advisor and advisee. The student is expected to be a self-starter generating and pursuing independent research leads. In each meeting, the student will report the week’s progress in research and writing, and arrive with research tasks to accomplish. The professor’s role is one of advice, guidance, and consent in the development and writing of the independent study’s main output: an original research paper.</p>														
<p>L Grading Scale, Grading Distribution, and</p>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="7">Grading Scale</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>94– 100</td> <td>4.0</td> <td>A</td> <td>77 – 79</td> <td>2.3</td> <td>C+</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Grading Scale							94– 100	4.0	A	77 – 79	2.3	C+	
Grading Scale															
94– 100	4.0	A	77 – 79	2.3	C+										

Due Dates	90 – 93	3.7	A-	73 – 76	2.0	C																		
	87 – 89	3.3	B+	70 – 72	1.7	C-																		
	83 – 86	3.0	B	60 – 69	1.0	D																		
	80 – 82	2.7	B-	Less Than 60	0	F																		
Grading Distribution																								
<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="text-align: center;">Assessment</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Weight</th> <th style="text-align: center;">Due Date</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Research paper proposal</td> <td style="text-align: center;">20%</td> <td>March 10 at midnight</td> </tr> <tr> <td>First draft of research paper</td> <td style="text-align: center;">30%</td> <td>March 28 at midnight</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Final draft of research paper</td> <td style="text-align: center;">30%</td> <td>May 6 at midnight</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Participation</td> <td style="text-align: center;">20%</td> <td>Ongoing</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td style="text-align: center;">100%</td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>							Assessment	Weight	Due Date	Research paper proposal	20%	March 10 at midnight	First draft of research paper	30%	March 28 at midnight	Final draft of research paper	30%	May 6 at midnight	Participation	20%	Ongoing	Total	100%	
Assessment	Weight	Due Date																						
Research paper proposal	20%	March 10 at midnight																						
First draft of research paper	30%	March 28 at midnight																						
Final draft of research paper	30%	May 6 at midnight																						
Participation	20%	Ongoing																						
Total	100%																							
M	Explanation of Assessments	<p>Participation: Your participation grade will be determined by your submitting work by our agreed-upon deadlines, having done assigned reading, having conducted additional independent research, and by a subjective assessment of how much effort you put into the project. I will utilize the entire 0-20% scale when assessing this grade!</p> <p>Proposal due March 10 at midnight: The proposal should <i>clearly</i> explain what you propose to write. It should contain a full and annotated outline of the paper and a list of references that you have relied on so far.</p> <p>First draft of research paper due March 28 at midnight: This first draft should contain a full and annotated outline of your final paper. The introduction (relevance, aims, and methods), literature review, and research design should be done at this stage. Any feasible plans for data collection must be clearly outlined. Academic references and formatting are required. Submit a version of the paper as a Word document or as a PDF.</p> <p>Final draft of research paper due May 6 at midnight: The final draft of no more than 7,000 words all-inclusive should contain revisions to the completed sections of your first draft. It should also contain a section in which you analyze your data and remark on its implications for the literature you reviewed earlier as well as for public policy. Your introduction and conclusion should concisely summarize what you did in the paper. The paper should be written at a high academic standard and conform to a consistent style. Ensure that you have properly attributed all work that is not your own. Submit a version of the paper as a Word document or as a PDF.</p> <p>In grading all of your writing, I tend to pay attention to the following criteria. There are many other good resources for learning how to write better, which I would be happy to guide you toward.</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Basic criteria:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Is your spelling and grammar flawless? Do you have the correct proper nouns? 																						

	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 2. Is your English prose easy to follow? Does your argument flow from one, readable paragraph to another without unnecessary diversions or interruptions? 3. Are you answering the question that you should be answering? You should be. Don't answer some other question, please. 4. Do you have a clear thesis? Is it clear to me what you are arguing, and can you recite that argument to me in person within a five-minute window? 5. Are your facts correct? Do you have the necessary empirical knowledge to inform your writing? 6. Have you read deeply enough on the topic? Have you read widely enough? Do you really understand what each of the sources that you've referred to argue? 7. Is your argument logically valid? Do conclusions of your arguments flow from your assumptions? <p style="text-align: center;"><i>More advanced criteria:</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 8. Do you properly cite the appropriate sources? Are these serious sources that are relevant to your inquiry? Have you cited page numbers, as you should? Are all of your book sources found in the AUS library, and if not, can you produce them to me if I request that you do? Have you gone beyond mere internet research and delved into scholarly journals, books, and even primary sources, where they are relevant? 9. Do you understand the potential weaknesses of your argument? Do you make a serious effort to present them? 10. Do you have a reply to potential counterarguments? Is your argument robust? 11. Do you state key assumptions, and are they plausible? Are you aware of what your argument assumes?
<p>N</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Other Information</p>	<p><i>About the professor:</i> Barry Hashimoto specializes in international institutions, law, and political violence. He has held positions in New York University Shanghai and the Department of Politics at New York University. At AUS, he teaches Introduction to International Relations, Public International Law, Human Rights in World Politics, Moot Court, and Global Political Economy. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from Emory University and his A.B. in Government from Dartmouth College.</p>

CLASS SCHEDULE

Week #	DATES	READING	NOTES
1	Jan 24	Syllabus	Determine objectives
2	Jan 31	Read two works from the first eight papers listed in lists A-F. Read Frieden 2006, pages 1-150.	Earmark papers that you are particularly interested in. Type up brief summaries of them. Generate an idea for a remark, extension, or reanalysis of the ideas in the paper.

3	Feb 7	<p>Read two more works from the first eight papers listed in lists A-F.</p> <p>Read Frieden 2006, pages 151-300.</p>	<p>Earmark papers that you are particularly interested in. Type up brief summaries of them. Generate an idea for a remark, extension, or reanalysis of the ideas in the paper.</p>
4	Feb 14	<p>Read two more works from the first eight papers listed in lists A-F.</p> <p>Read Frieden 2006, pages 301-475.</p>	<p>Earmark papers that you are particularly interested in. Type up brief summaries of them. Generate an idea for a remark, extension, or reanalysis of the ideas in the paper.</p>
5	Feb 21	<p>Read 33% of all works in a selected list A-F.</p> <p>Extra-curricular reading as necessary.</p>	<p>Compile notes on these readings in which you explain clearly what the authors argue, discover, and conclude. Make note of their research methodology. List the five most important additional articles, books, or primary resources that you will get a hold of for your research resources.</p>
6	Feb 28	<p>Read 33% of all works in a selected list A-F.</p> <p>Extra-curricular reading as necessary.</p>	<p>Compile notes on these readings in which you explain clearly what the authors argue, discover, and conclude. Make note of their research methodology. List the five most important additional articles, books, or primary resources that you will get a hold of for your research resources.</p>
7	Mar 7	<p>Read 33% of all works in a selected list A-F.</p> <p>Extra-curricular reading as necessary.</p>	<p>Compile notes on these readings in which you explain clearly what the authors argue, discover, and conclude. Make note of their research methodology. List the five most</p>

			important additional articles, books, or primary resources that you will get a hold of for your research resources. Begin writing your original research paper.
8	Mar 14	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Write your research paper.
9	Mar 21	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Write your research paper.
10	Mar 28	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	First draft of research paper due at midnight.
11	April 11	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Revise your research paper. Professor Hashimoto will be with the Moot Court team in Washington, D.C. this week.
12	April 18	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Revise your research paper.
13	April 25	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Revise your research paper.
14	May 2	Read additional resources selected in consultation with the student.	Final draft of research paper due on May 5 at midnight.